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COzNMo S
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH-ITS EFFECT
UPON THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF SECTION 482
And so it is. The result of today's decision may not be too
important, for it affects only a few taxpayers. It seems to me,
however, that it effectively dulls one edge of what has been a
sharp two edged tool fashioned and bestowed by the Congress
upon the Internal Revenue Service for the effective enforcement
of our Federal tax laws.'
The "two edged tool" of Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
in Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah2 denotes the dis-
cretionary power of allocation given the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue by Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Its
edge was not dulled in the international business scene where its use
is most notorious, but in its use upon the monetary structure of a
domestic bank holding corporation through the slightly tarnished
theory of taxpayer disability.
The first decision of the United States Supreme Court on Section
482 of the Internal Revenue Code comes at a time when the Com-
missioner is relying more and more upon this simply-worded, but
powerful, statutory weapon to attack commonly controlled taxpayers
in an effort either to prevent tax evasion or to reflect the true taxable
income of the entities.3 Section 482 provides that:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary or his
delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deduc-
tions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, ap-
portionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion
of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses.
4
The controversy which has been engendered5 is evidenced by the
amalgam of principles and policies of tax law relied upon by the Tax
1 Comm'r v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 426 (1972).
2Id.
3 During the 1930's, Section 482 served more in the role of a "silent police-
man." During the past ten years its application to foreign and domestic operations
has increased significantly. A recent computer report stated that Section 482 was
the most frequently cited section in deficiency notices in pending cases in the
Mid-Atlantic Region. Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482-Still Growing at the Age of 50,
46 TAxEs 893, 894 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Seieroe].
426 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
5 This case began as a Tax Court memorandum. 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1320
(1967).
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Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court in the judicial evolution of the case. The rationales
of the decisions have been based either directly or indirectly on such
issues as taxpayer disability, generation of income, dominion or control
over income, assignment of income, and illegality of receipt of income.
Mr. Justice Powell, in his first opinion for the Court, wrote that the
Commissioner's exercise of Section 482 authority was unwarranted
where a holding company did not utilize its control over two national
banks to distort their true taxable income.6 The implied prohibition
by federal law of the receipt of insurance sales commissions by na-
tional banks was considered by the Court to be sufficient disability to
inhibit the holding company's exercise of "complete power." The de-
cision, in which two strong dissenting opinions were entered, came on
a six to three vote of the Court.7
The relatively uncomplicated history of Section 482 had its legisla-
tive beginnings in the Revenue Act of 1918.8 Section 240 of that Act
provided for the filing of consolidated returns by affiliated corporations
and in so doing recognized the existence of commonly controlled
businesses.9 In 1921 Congress, in adding a proviso to the Act of 1918,10
established what has been called the "single enterprise approach" by
giving the Commissioner the power to consolidate the accounts of
related taxpayers. The purpose of Section 240(d) of the Revenue
Act of 1921 was to "prevent the arbitrary shifting of profits among
related businesses"" and to prevent corporations from "milking"
their subsidiaries or "otherwise improperly manipulat[ing] the financial
6 405 U.S. at 400-01.
7 Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion can be found at 405 U.S. 407-18. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice White joined, can be
found at 405 U.S. 418-26.
8 The legislative history of Section 482 appears in the following articles:
Murdoch, The Scope of the Power of the Internal Revenue Service to Reallocate
Under Section 482, 6 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 717 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Murdoch]; Spaeth, Section 482-Past and Future, 47 TAXs 45, 46-47 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Spaeth].
9 Section 240 stated that two or more domestic corporations are affiliated (1)
if one corporation owned directly or controlled "through closely affiliated interests
i.. substantially all the stock of the other or others, or (2) if substantially all the
stock of two or more corporations is owned or controlled by the same interests."
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 240(b), 40 Stat. 1082 (1919).
10 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 227.
That in any case of two or more related trades or businesses (whether
unincorporated or incorporated and whether organized in the United
States or not) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same in-
terests, the Commissioner may consolidate the accounts of such related
trades and businesses, in any proper case, for the purpose of making an
accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deduc-
tions, or capital between or among such related trades or businesses.
11 S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1921).
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accounts of the parent company."12 Changes, considered purely tech-
nical, were made in Section 240(d) by the Revenue Act of 1924.13 A
further change-making reallocation of profits mandatory at the request
of the taxpayer-was embodied in Section 240(f) of the Revenue Act
of 1926.14
With the adoption of the 1926 Act, the stage was set for the most
recognizable ancestor of Section 482-Section 45 of the Revenue Act
of 1928.15 Two significant changes were embodied in Section 45.16
First the taxpayer was not privileged to require a reallocation. The
new provision became "solely a government sword" and was no longer
available to reallocate gross income and deductions among related
taxpayers whereas previously Section 240(f) had permitted a con-
solidation of accounts of the related businesses.1 7 The language of the
House Committee Report on Section 45 makes clear the congressional
intention: "to prevent tax evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making
of fiictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the
purpose of 'milking')." 18 Two minor changes in the statutory language
were made by the Revenue Acts of 193419 and 1948.20 No legislative
12 H.R. EFP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1921).
13 Spaeth, supra note 8, at 46.
14 This Act provided that the Commissioner might "consolidate the accounts"
of commonly controlled trades or businesses, if such was "necessary in order to
make an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deduc-
tions or capital" among the commonly controlled businesses. Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 136, § 240(f), 44 Stat. 46.
15 The new language in Section 45 was:
In any case of two or more trades or businesses (whether or not
organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner
is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income or de-
ductions between or among such trades or businesses, if he determines
that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such trades or businesses. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat.
806.
10 Murdoch, supra note 8, at 718.
17 The House Committee Report specifically noted this change and explained
it as being aimed at forestalling any contention that nonaffiliated corporations can
achieve the equivalent of a filing of a consolidated return. H.R. REa'. No. 2, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
sId.
19,Section 45 was slightly expanded to add the term "organization" to the
terms "trades or businesses." These terms are used to explain and describe the
entities among which reallocations could be made. According to the congressional
committee reports the change was made to insure that the phrase would be inter-
preted to be applicable to all kinds of business activity. Revenue Act of 1934, ch.
277, § 45, 48 Stat. 680. H.R. Rzi,. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) and S.
REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).2o This statutory language change adds credits and allowances to the list of
items subject to reallocation; previously gross income and deductions were the
only items. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 240, § 128(b), 58 Stat. 47.
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changes have been made since 1948; Section 45 of the 1939 Code re-
mains unaltered as Section 482 of the 1954 Code.
There is considerable administrative discretion in the application
of Section 482, but three requirements must be met before Section 482
can be invoked: first, there must be two or more organizations, trades
or businesses; second, there must be common control; and third, con-
trol must be exercised to understate "true taxable income" or to evade
taxation. 21 Treasury Regulations have been promulgated to establish
the guidelines for application of this section and to outline the extent
of the Commissioner's powers. The first such Regulations, in 1934,22
were promulgated to clarify the proposition that the section was not
to be limited to sham transactions designed to reduce the taxpayer's
liability for taxes, 23 nor to foreign trade corporations. The Regulations
attempted to extend the Commissioner's power of allocation into the
area of mere tax avoidance. 24 The Treasury introduced its "arm's
length" and "true net income" concepts at this time. The Commissioner
is given the power to scrutinize closely all transactions between
mutually controlled corporations with the object of arriving at the
true net income of each controlled taxpayer by using as a standard
an uncontrolled taxpayer's dealing at "arns length" with another un-
controlled taxpayer.
25
JuDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Initially the courts were reluctant to go beyond the question of
tax evasion in permitting the application of this discretionary section,
except in extreme cases.2 6 It has been held that the mere creation of
a corporation to take advantage of the tax laws does not of itself
constitute evasion of taxes under Section 482.27 Taxpayers were
generally free to structure their business affairs to their best interests,
including tax savings. Judge Learned Hand expressed this sentiment:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister
in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.
Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes
21 Seieroe, supra note 3, at 894.
22 Treas. Reg. § 29.45-1 (1948).
23 Spaeth, supra note 8, at 45, 49.
24 The courts were more reluctant to recognize the latter of Section 482's dual
purposes-" to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income."
25 See Oil Base, Inc. v. Comm'r, 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1966); Baldwin Bros.
v. Comm'r, 361 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1966); Spicer Theatre, Inc. v. Comm'r, 346
F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1965); Aiken Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. United States 281
F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1959); Comm'r v. Chelsea Products, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.
1952).26 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
27 W. Braun Co. v. Comm'r, 396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968).
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any public duty to pay more than the law demands; taxes are en-
forced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in
the name of morals is mere cant.
28
In addition to the general hesitancy to cross the boundary of tax
avoidance, particular concepts unfavorable to the application of Sec-
tion 482 and its predecessors emerged. The courts early held that
Section 482 "did not authorize the Commissioner to set up income
where none existed."29 This "creation of income" concept was vague
enough to provide an umbrella for numerous taxpayers. Furthermore,
the Commissioner has not been justified in applying the section where
the businesses in question are separate and distinct entities with
'legitimate business purposes."30 The taxpayer had merely to show
that there was a business purpose-other than tax savings-for having
separately controlled entities and that the assignment of income and
deductions to these entities was likewise reasonable.
THE ExPNEDi SCOPE
A few setbacks were not to dampen the Treasury's spirit for the
use of this valuable "tool." After all, the mandate ". . . to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organiza-
tion .. ."3 -' provided the Commissioner with virtually unlimited dis-
cretion to allocate income. The courts ruled that the taxpayer had
the burden of showing that the Commissioner had acted "arbitrarily"
or "capriciously" in making the allocation.32 In view of its potentialities,
it is not surprising that the scope and use of Section 482 underwent a
process of continuous growth.as
This growth was most apparent in the proposed Regulations of
1966.34 Approved in 1968,35 the characteristics of these Regulations
are summarized as follows:
28 Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Chirelstein,
Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440
(1968).
29 Simon J. Murphy Co. v. Comm'r, 231 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1956); Tennessee-
Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commr, 112 F.2d 508 (6th iro. 1940). Epsen Litho-
graphers v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181 (D. Neb. 1946). See Arc, Lewis, Tax
Court in Huber Homes Holds That the I.R.S. May Not Use 482 to Create income,
34 J. TAX. 208 (1971).
SOW. Braun Co. v. Comm'r, 396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968); U.H. Monette &
Co. v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 15 (1965); Virginia Metal Prod., Inc. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.
788 (1960).
3126 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).32 See Philipp Bros. Chem., Inc. v. Comn'r, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970);
Charles Town, Inc. v. Comm'r, 372 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1967); Advance Mach.
Exch. v. Comm'r, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1952).
3 Seieroe, supra note 3, at 893.
34 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 31 Fed. Reg. 10294 (1966).
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 33 Fed. Reg. 5848 (1968).
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(1) Parent and subsidiary must deal with each other in much,
if not precisely, the same way as unrelated, conceivably com-
peting companies.
(2) Transactions are to be measured by various objective tests set
forth in the Regulations, which pay little, if any, attention to
the business purposes being served by the transactions being
examined. 36
The Service also took the opportunity to state that Section 482 and
the new Regulations were to be applicable to transactions between
related domestic taxpayers. This presented a warning that Section 482
would be used against domestic taxpayers where there have been
significant deviations from "arm's length" dealings or where there has
been a significant shifting of income.
37
FimsT SEcunr
It was in the spirit of this expanded scope that the Commissioner
approached First Security Corporation in 1967. First Security Corpo-
ration [hereinafter referred to as the Holding Company] includes
within its fully owned subsidiaries First Security Bank of Utah and
First Security Bank of Idaho [the Banks]. Other pertinent non-bank
subsidiaries include First Security Company [Management Company]
and, since 1954, First Security Life Insurance Company of Texas
[Security Life].
Beginning in 1948, the Banks encouraged their borrowers to pur-
chase credit life insurance. Their obvious reasons included: (1) offer-
ing a service increasingly supplied by competing financial institutions,
(2) obtaining the benefit of the additional collateral which credit
insurance provides by repaying loans upon the death, injury, or illness
of the borrower, and (3) providing an additional source of income-
part of the premiums-to the Holding Company or its subsidiaries 38
Prior to 1954, the insurance was placed with an independent insurance
carrier. Commissions of 40 to 55 per cent were paid to an insurance
agency subsidiary of the Holding Company and the income was
included in the taxable income for the Management Company. Since
the Management Company and the Banks paid essentially the same
tax rate, the allocation was of little interest to the Commissioner.
However, in 1954, Security Life was organized by the Holding Com-
pany to reinsure all credit life placed by the Banks with an inde-
pendent insurer, pursuant to a treaty by which Security Life received
36 Spaeth, supra note 8, at 50.3 7 Steiner, How New 482 Regs Apply to Domestic Taxpayers: A Powerful
I.R.S. Weapon, 25 J. TAx. 258 (1966).
38 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1451 (1967).
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85 per cent of the premiums for assuming the risks. For the remaining
15 per cent, the independent carrier assumed the major administrative
functions. With an initial capital of $25,00039 and an initial paid-in
surplus of $12,500,40 Security Life realized net profits in excess of
one and a half million dollars during its first five years of operation.
No sales commissions were paid. Security Life reported all the rein-
surance premiums on its income tax returns for the period 1955 to
1959, at the preferential tax rate for insurance companies.41 The Com-
missioner, pursuant to his power under Section 482, determined that
40 per cent, some $700,000, of Security Life's premium income was
allocable to the Banks as commission income earned for "originating"
and "processing" the credit life insurance.
The allocation met no resistance in its initial test before the Tax
Court.42 The court relied on a recent Seventh Circuit case nearly
identical on its facts.43 In Local Finance v. Commissioner,44 a holding
company controlled several finance companies and an insurance com-
pany which similarly reinsured the credit life funneled through the
finance companies. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Commissioner properly allocated 50 per cent of the net premiums
to the finance companies even though the companies did not receive
any premiums and were forbidden by state law from doing so.45 The
court followed a simple generation of income concept.46 The finance
companies were responsible for generating the income and therefore
should be taxed on it. The Seventh Circuit, citing Lucas v. Earl,47
noted that the doctrine of anticipatory assignment of income negated
59 Security Life's capital was increased to $100,000 in 1956 through a
$75,000 stock dividend.
40 This was an unusually low capitalization with which to begin an insurance
company. In 1954, Texas had low minimum capitalization requirements for in-
corporating insurance companies.
41 Both the Life Insurance Company Act of 1955, 70 Stat. 36, and the Life
Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959; 73 Stat. 112, accorded preferential tax treat-
ment to life insurance companies.
4236 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1451 (1967).
43 Local Fin. Co. v. Commr, 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
956 (1969).
44 Id.
45 The state law argument was based on Indiana's Small Loan Law, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 18-3002 (1964).
46 Under the generation of income doctrine a taxpayer who designates an
entity to perform services and exercises control over that entity is taxable upon in-
come produced by such services.
The "generation of income" doctrine has been described as a corollary of the
"assignment of income" doctrine. The incidence of tax in both of these doctrines is
based on the definition of who controls the income. The "assignment of income"
doctrine focuses on the power to control the disposition of income, while the
generation of income doctrine focuses on the power to control the creation of in-
come.
47 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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the taxpayer's argument that it never had control over the premium
income.
In reviewing First Security on appeal, the Tenth Circuit was in
disagreement with this generation of income concept.48 The court
said that since the Banks in fact did not receive any commissions and
were prohibited by law from doing so, the Commissioner's attribution
of a portion of the premium income to them was unwarranted. The
court found the position taken by the Commissioner that "whoever
generates income must include the amount thereof in his gross
income"49 to be a "fallacy."
Indeed, the acceptance of the generation of business theory would
have alarming consequences on normal commercial practices such
as all types of referral business and security commission giveups.
... We believe that in principle it runs contrary to all court and
Tax Court decisions except Local Finance.50
The Supreme Court subsequently granted the Commissioner's
petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict between the two circuits.6'
Mr. Justice Powell (for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Rehnquist) affirmed the Tenth Cir-
cuit on the essential premise that the Bank "could never have received
a share of these premiums."
The cornerstone of the majority's decision is the relationship of
illegality of receipt of income with the inability to tax-a "taxpayer's
disability" proposition. Courts have held that 12 United States Code §
92-which authorizes national banks to act as insurance agents when
located in places having a population not to exceed 5,000-by implica-
tion prohibits banks in areas where the population exceeds 5,000 from
acting as agents.52 Relying on this statute, the Court reasoned that
48436 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1971).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1197.
51 Comm'r v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
82 TeComnp troiler of the Currency considers 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (1945) to be
effective-although when the National Bank Act was revised in 1918, § 92 was omit-
ted- 12 CFR § 2.1-2.5 (1971). The revisers of the United States Code have
omitted it from recent editions of the Code. Courts, have held that this statute
applies to banks of First Security of Utah's size by implication.
Section 92 provides:
If the directors of any national banking association shall knowingly
violate, or knowingly permit any of the officers, agents, or servants of the
association to violate any of the provisions of this chapter, all the rights,
privileges, and franchises of the association shall be thereby forfeited.
... And in cases of such violation, every director who participated in or
assented to the same shall be held liable in his personal and individual
capacity for all damages which the association, its shareholders, or any
other persons, shall have sustained in consequence of such violation.
[Vol. 61
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since the Banks were legally barred from ever receiving the money
they could not be taxed.
In weaving a taxpayer's disability argument, Justice Powell turned
to the Section 61 principle of "complete dominion." To support his
conclusion "that in order to be taxed for income, a taxpayer must
have complete dominion over it," he relied upon dictum expressed in
two previous Supreme Court cases-Corliss v. Bowers53 and Harrison v.
Schaffner.5 4 To apply the "complete dominion" restraint on Section
482 the Court used a sentence of the Commissioner's Regulations:
The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are as-
sumed to have complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer
so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records
truly reflect the taxable income from the property and business of
each of the controlled taxpayers.55
The Court stated that "[tihe regulation, as applied to the facts in
this case, contemplates that Holding Company-the controlling interest
-must have 'complete power' to shift income among its subsidiaries."5 6
The Court reasoned that since the Holding Company did not have
the power to force the Banks to violate the law by accepting the
premiums, it did not have "complete power." 7 Since the Commissioner
is only authorized to reallocate under Section 482 where "complete
power" exists and has been used in such a way as to understate the
"true taxable income of the subsidiary," the reallocation was unwar-
ranted3 8 If the "complete power" concept were interpreted broadly,
it could be said that the Court has added another condition that must
be satisfied before Section 482 can be applied.
The present statutory language defining the term "control" is
extremely vague. The Treasury Regulations state that:
Control includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether
legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised. It is
reality of the control which is decisive, not its form or the mode of
its exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or deductions
have been arbitrarily shifted.5 9
63281 U.S. 376 (1930).
54 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1971).
56 405 U.S. at 404.
57 Justice Blackmun noted that the quotation used by the Court to uphold the
complete dominion" theory "consists of language used to support the taxation of
income; it is not language, as the Court would make it out to be, that supported
the nontaxation of income.' 405 U.S. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58 405 U.S. at 405.
5 9 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3) (1971).
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For Section 482 to be applicable the Commissioner must determine
whether the two or more organizations in question are "owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests."6 0 Unlike other
Code provisions defining control, this statutory language is simple,
plastic and not tied by cross reference or otherwise to additional
sections of the Code.6 1 The Regulations give the statutory language
the broadest possible application.
A 1952 Tax Court decision was offered as token case support for
this concept of disability through illegality. In L. E. Skunk Latex Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Commissioner,6 2 the same interest controlled both a manu-
facturer and a distributor of rubber prophylactics. By a quirk of OPA
Price Regulation during World War II, the distributor was allowed
to raise prices while the manufacturer was not. In an attempt to
allocate a portion of the distributor's income to the manufacturer, the
Tax Court held that the Commissioner had "no authority to attribute
to Petitioners [manufacturers], income which they could not have
received." In 1952, the Tax Court may well have been influenced by
the Supreme Court's prior holding in Commissioner v. Wilcox.63
The Court did not rely upon Section 482's much used "arns-
length" standard in its analysis of the case. No banks (controlled or
non-controlled) could receive commissions so there were no arm's-
length transactions with which to compare the fact situation in First
Security. Apparently no thought was given to contrasting the tax
consequences before 1954-when the Banks were dealing at arm's-
length with an independent insurance carrier-with the controlled
insurance period after 1954. Local Finance was doomed; the coup de
maitre had been administered quickly if somewhat unsatisfactorily.64
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, closely examined the
language of Section 92 and the historical context in which it evolved.65
He found that Congress was not only concerned with the receipt of
insurance commissions, but also with restricting the activities-soliciting
and selling-that generated the money. It appears that the majority
semantically sidestepped the "soliciting and selling" issue by describ-
60 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1971).
61 Murdoch, supra note 8, at 719.
62 18 T.C. 940 (1952).
63 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
64 Teschner, First Security Bank of Utah Taxpayer Disability and the Supreme
Court, 50 TAXES 260, 265 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Teschner].
65 Justice Marshall based his congressional intent argument on a letter writ-
ten by John Skelton Williams, who was then Comptroller of the Currency, to
Congress. 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 was added to the federal banking laws in 1916 at his
suggestion. Letter of June 8, 1916, to Senate, 52 CONG. REc. 11001 (July 17,
1916).
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ing it as "originating" or "referring."66 Regardless of the words used,
the fact remains that the Banks were the responsible force behind
the income. The loan officers explained the policy to the borrower,
filled out the application form, collected the premiums and forwarded
them to Management Company. Justice Marshall concluded:
The substance is either that the respondents violated federal law,
earned illegal income, attempted to avoid taxation on the income
by channeling it elsewhere, and were caught by the Commissioner;
or, that they did not violate federal law by soliciting sales of in-
surance and that there is no legal bar to their receiving the pro-
ceeds from their sales. In either case, the result is the same, and
respondents cannot prevail.
67
The Court's linking of illegality and taxability in order to con-
struct a taxpayer's disability argument is not unique. In Wilcox 68 the
Court developed the short-lived "claim of right" doctrine, based on
the proposition that illegally obtained income was not taxable.69 In
First Security the Court discussed whether the taxpayers actually re-
ceived or had a "right" to receive the insurance premiums. As in Wil-
cox, Justice Powell focused on the "imaginary barrier of illegality."
70
It should be noted, however, that the Court limited the import of
Wilcox in its opinion in Rutkin v. United States7l and finally hurdled
the barrier of illegality of income when it overruled Wilcox in James v.
United States.72
The fact that the Banks did not actually receive the premiums is
of no importance. Taxability without formal receipt is found in a
variety of contexts in our tax law. 73 This proposition is especially
66Neither the statute nor the regulations used the words "originating and
referring" insurance. Justice Marshall suggests that the Court is attempting to
distinguish sub silentio between "originating and referring" and "soliciting" and
only the latter is illegal. 405 U.S. at 414.
67 405 U.S. at 416.6 8 Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
9The Court in Wilcox concluded that embezzled income was not taxable to
the embezzler.
70 405 U.S. at 405.
71 343 U.S. 130 (1952). The Court in effect overruled the Wilcox case when
it limited the import of the decision to its facts. The Court held that income
obtained by extortion was taxable income to the extortioner. In James v. United
States, the Court concluded that an "examination of the reasoning used in Rutkin
leads us inescapably to the conclusion that Wilcox was thoroughly devitalized."
366 U.S. 213, 215 (1960).
72 366 U.S. 213, 222 (1960).73 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), and Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930) (for income or earnings assigned to another and never received);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (for the income from bond coupons
assigned to another and never received); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940) (for another's income from a short-term trust); Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670 (1933) (for irrevocable trust income used to pay insurance premiums
on the settlor's life).
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evident in the context of the application of Section 482. Careful
scrutiny of the legislative, judicial and regulatory histories of Section
482 reveals a concern for the proper reflection of income among com-
monly controlled companies. It is the purpose of the statute to allow
the Commissioner to go beyond the form in which a transaction is
structured to its substance.4 The essence of Section 482 is the real-
location of income regardless of the formal receipt.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice White joined in dis-
senting, chose to grant Section 482 the wider interpretation called for
by the Regulations and refused to link illegality with inability to tax.
He submitted that
Section 482 has a double purpose and a double target. It author-
izes the Secretary or his delegate . .. to allocate whenever he
determines it necessary so to do in order (a) "to prevent evasion
of taxes" or (b) "clearly to reflect the income of any of the con-
trolled entities." 75
Justice Blackmun treated the case with a great deal of deliberation,
dividing his dissent into fifteen parts. His most persuasive argument
centered upon the "generation of income" concept used in Local Fi-
nance, a concept refuted by the Tenth Circuit, and avoided by the
majority. He asserted that the "[b]anks were the responsible force
behind the premium income. No one else was." 76 It had been the
Banks who gave out and examined the applications, prepared the
certificates of insurance, collected the premiums, and sent the forms
and premiums to the Management Company. "Clearly, services were
rendered by that bank on behalf of its commonly controlled affiliate.
Just as clearly, those services would have been compensated bad the
corporations been dealing with each other at arm's length." 77
The majority of the Court failed to grasp this most critical argument.
CONCLUSION
One writer has stated that the decision in First Security "[h]as
infused tax law with a basic humanism-has, in short, treated taxpayers
compassionately and as people."78 The taxpayers here treated "com-
passionately" were not individuals, nor were they even small businesses.
The taxpayers who will benefit from this decision are large corpora-
tions and business associations whose size already gives them a corn-
74 The substance rather than the form of a transaction has been the rationale
for many decisions to tax by the Internal Revenue Service.
75 405 U.S. at 419.
76 Id. at 421.
77 Id. at 422.78 Teschner, supra note 64, at 260.
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mercial advantage over their smaller competitors. The decision simply
prevents the Commissioner from denying additional tax avoidance.
The courts have yet to shed light upon the difficult task of inter-
preting First Security's effect upon the future application of Section
482. If construed in the most narrow sense, the case would have
importance only where receipt of income would be prohibited by
statute or otherwise unlawful. While bank holding and finance com-
panies are widespread,79 there would be some credibility to Justice
Blackmun's statement that First Security "affects only a few taxpayers."
The significance of the case might lie in the fact that Justice Powell
avoided the application of the "generation of income" concept in the
context of Section 482.0 This issue was the backbone not only of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in First Security but also that of Local Finance,
although the respective conclusions of the courts differed. Justice
Breitenstein, writing for the Tenth Circuit, found that the "[g]eneration
of business is not enough to impose federal income tax liability."81
He held that the Banks did not earn the premium payments and that,
although they physically received them, they acted only as a conduit
to pass the payments on to those legally entitled to receive them.82
The Tenth Circuit hypothesized that the application of the business
generation theory in this context would be overly broad.83 Teschner v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue8A explained the ramifications:
If this were the law agents, conduits, fiduciaries, and others in a
similar capacity would be personally taxable on the proceeds of
their efforts. The charity fund-raiser would be taxable on the sums
contributed as the result of his efforts. The employee would be
79In 1965, there were 550 one-bank holding companies with commercial
deposits of $15.1 billion. By the end of 1969, this number had grown to more than
890 with commercial deposits exceeding $181 billion-a figure representing 43
per cent of all deposits in insured commercial banks in the United States. Note,
The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
1200 (1971).
80 Justice Powell in footnote 11 of his opinion stated:
The court below held that the mere generation of business does not
necessarily result in taxable income. As we decide this case on a different
ground, we need not consider the circumstances in which the origination
or referral of business may or may not result in taxable income to the
originating party. We do agree that origination of business does not
necessarily result in such income. 405 U.S. at 401.
81436 F.2d at 1198.
82 Id.
83 The court concluded that:
[T]he acceptance of the generation of business theory would have alarm-
ing consequences on normal commercial practices such as all types of
referral business and security commission giveups. We believe that in
principle it runs contrary to all court and Tax Court decisions except Local
Finance. Id. at 1197.
84 38 T.C. 103 (1962).
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taxable on income generated for his employer by his efforts. Such
results are completely at variance with every accepted concept of
Federal income taxation. 85
The context in which the generation of income doctrine is applied
must be considered. Teschner and Blair v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue86 involved unrelated, independent companies and unrelated
individuals. However, First Security involves a complicated, inter-
related economic structure where a relatively specific section is being
applied. In this case, the premiums stayed within a corporate structure
dominated by the Holding Company, and "did not pass elsewhere
with consequent tax impact elsewhere."87 The situation was quite dif-
ferent in Teschner and Blair.
The refusal by the Court to rely upon an interpretation of the
generation of income argument to decide the case further dampens
the limited success the Commissioner had when the court in Local
Finance first adopted that proposition.88 Although the court avoided
the quagmire of the generation of income doctrine, it entered another
by applying the "complete dominion" theory of Section 61 to create
a "complete power" requirement in the Section 482 context. The Court
substantially adopted a "panoramic view" for a very precise and
specific authority.8 9
Broadly interpreted, the application of the "complete dominion"
theory could mean the Commissioner's power to create income under
Section 482 would be limited to the power now existing under
Section 61. This conclusion would be contrary to Congressional intent,
85 Id. at 1007.
86 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
87 405 U.S. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88 Historically, the use of the generation of income doctrine by the Commis-
sioner has met with little success. The Supreme Court rejected this doctrine in a
Section 61 case involving a multicorporate business structure, Nat'l Carbide Corp.
v. Commr, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). However, in Marc's Big Boy v. Prospect, Inc.
52 T.C. 1073 (1969), the Commissioner relied on the doctrine to support a
reallocation of income under Section 482. Although the Tax Court upheld the
argument, it has been criticized because its application in the tax law would
"result in unjustifiable absurdities and inconsistencies." Lee, Section 482 and the
Integrated Business Enterprise, 57 VA. L. REv. 1376, 1414 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Lee].
The generation of income doctrine has been described as a "blunt tool" that
forces the Court to disregard corporate entities that are not shams. Id. at 1411.
It has also been called an "all or nothing" approach that would contradict the
Section 482 concept of partial allocation of income between related, but separate,
taxable entities. Moreover, applying the generation of income doctrine in Section
482 cases deprives the law oF the predictability that would have attended Section
482 cases had the specific guidelines prescribed in the Regulations prevailed. For
a thorough discussion of the adoption of the generation of income doctrine in the
Section 482 context, see Lee, 1409-291.
89 Seieroe, &upra note 3, at 899.
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the relatively explicit Regulations defining its application and its
judicial history.
This decision may also have an impact on certain procedural prin-
ciples which attach to a Section 482 case. Besides the usual pre-
sumption of correctness for the Commissioner in tax cases, in the recent
past the taxpayer has had to show additionally that the Section 482
allocation was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. 90 This formida-
ble advantage in favor of the Commissioner may have been reduced
by First Security. Judicial decisions in this area have had limited value
as precedent because of the highly factual character of typical Section
482 cases.91 This limitation may be the only solace the Commissioner
will find in this case in future years.
James E. Rogers and Danny R. Taulbee
90 See, e.g., Grenada Ind Inc. v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 231, 255 (1951), aff'd, 202
F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953); Nat'l Sec. Corp. v.
Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 562, 565 (1947), affd, 137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943); G.U.R. Co. v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 223, 228 (1940),
aff'd, 117 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941).91 For a thorough discussion of the applicable standards and procedures in
Section 482 cases, see Eustice, Tax Problems Arising From Transactions Between
Afliliated or Controlled Corporations, 23 TAx L. REv. 451, 492-96 (1968).
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